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The Past and Future of Democracy 
in the Middle East
Rashid Khalidi
Self-sufficient and secure on the continent that they have domi-
nated for centuries, Americans have always looked on the world
beyond the seas with a certain suspicion. In consequence, it has
required an extraordinary effort and the call of a noble cause to per-
suade the American people that their country should engage itself
abroad — whence the Fourteen Points, the Four Freedoms, and the
struggle against International Communism.
As the administration of President George W. Bush tried to answer
the persistent objections of its critics in 2002 and early 2003 to the pre-
texts it advanced for the radical step of a preemptive war in the Gulf—
the first preemptive war in American history1 — it increasingly turned
to the democratization of Iraq as a war aim. In spite of the unprece-
dented sense of insecurity in the United States resulting from the sur-
prise attacks of September 11, 2001, on New York and Washington,
D.C., the administration’s vivid descriptions of the danger of Iraqi
weapons of mass destruction (which now appear to have been exag-
gerated or false) were apparently not enough to bring the American
people to support the war without reservation. It was thus necessary
for the administration to invoke the need to remove a Baathist regime
guilty of abysmal human rights violations against its own people,
notably the Shi’ites and Kurds, as a sufficient reason for the United
States to launch an unprovoked war against Iraq. But even simple
“regime change” was apparently not enough: only turning that sad
country into a functioning democracy would be a goal worthy of
American ideals.
I will leave aside the highly problematic concept of one country
actively “democratizing” another, with all the hubris that is implied,
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not to speak of the fact that such a notion ignores how democracies
actually evolve in real historical situations. Instead, I will focus on the
important question of whether there was any real meaning or sincerity
in the use of the term democratization by the Bush administration and
its supporters as they beat the drums for an invasion of Iraq. Many
doubts have been raised about the sincerity of these apostles of democ-
racy, given that top officeholders in the Bush administration included
figures who had amply shown their contempt for the democratic
process at home and abroad, like Elliot Abrams and Admiral Poindex-
ter, both convicted of lying to Congress over the Iran-Contra affair.2
There are other grounds for skepticism on this score, since many of
those who had so fervently preached the virtues of democracy in Iraq
had never before been known for their solicitude either for the Iraqi
people or for democracy in the Arab Middle East.
It is important to recognize that if carried out fully and consistently,
a shift toward encouraging democracy and respect for human rights
would constitute a reversal of an American policy toward Iraq that
lasted for well over a decade (from at least 1978 until after the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait in 1990). This policy consisted of directly and indi-
rectly supporting the Iraqi Baath regime against its Islamic Iranian
neighbor, including the wherewithal for Iraq to produce chemical
weapons via provision by American and European companies. Such a
policy, in turn, constituted only one element in a longstanding Ameri-
can approach to the Middle East based on studiously ignoring the
human rights abuses and/or the undemocratic governments with
which the United States was on the best of terms.
As the administration made its preparations for war with Iraq, there
were a few other straws in the wind consonant with this proclaimed
change in its Middle East policy in favor of support for democracy and
human rights in the region. These included freezing aid to Egypt in
response to that country’s jailing of Saad al-Din Ibrahim, an Egyptian-
American academic and critic of the Mubarak regime who has now
been released, and President Bush’s demand for reform and democra-
tization in the Palestinian Authority in his June 2002 policy speech on
the Middle East, although in both cases doubts were raised as to the
real objectives of these new departures in American policy.
There have been lonely voices in the human rights community and
among Middle East specialists who have long criticized the human
rights abuses and anti-democratic nature of Middle Eastern govern-
ments aligned with the United States. These include the regimes of
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countries like Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Egypt, which have consis-
tently mistreated their minorities, tortured political prisoners, or muz-
zled the political opposition; Turkey, which until very recently forcibly
repressed Kurdish demands for cultural and linguistic rights; and
Israel, now in the 37th year of an occupation of the West Bank and
Gaza Strip that negates the democratic right of self-determination for
the Palestinians. These countries’ actions have rarely provoked the ire
of the Bush administration, or indeed of earlier American administra-
tions. For those who have regularly criticized these abuses taking place
in Turkey, the Arab world, and Israel, such a change in American pol-
icy would be welcome, if a real change were in fact to take place. It
would be considerably more encouraging if the same music were
played in Washington regarding not only traditional whipping boys
like Syria and Libya, with their harshly repressive regimes, but also
close allies with whom the United States has major strategic and
energy interests and is conspicuously silent about abuses, like Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Israel, and Turkey.
If spreading democracy in the Middle East were to become a central
objective of United States policy, as the Bush administration’s rhetoric
indicates, that would certainly be a good thing, depending, of course,
on the means employed to achieve this objective. It would be espe-
cially good if it were consistent, and included respect for elected lead-
ers and governments, such as those of Iran, Lebanon, and the
Palestinian Authority, even if they operate in systems that are highly
imperfect, and, more to the point, even if they say and do things that
may be disagreeable to U.S. policymakers. During the lead-up to the
war, it was particularly instructive to observe the behavior of leading
Bush administration advocates of “democratizing” Iraq as they tried to
oblige a Turkish government with an overwhelming mandate in a
recent election to go against the clear wishes of the great majority of
their people and accede to American requests to use their territory as a
military base for the war on Iraq. One “administration official” fulmi-
nated, “the Turks seem to think we’ll keep the bazaar open all night.”
Their pique was unseemly and showed, perhaps, how shallow their
democratic inclinations were3 when Turkish leaders dragged their feet
in acquiescing to U.S. demands in the face of polls that showed as
many as 95 percent of Turks opposed to war on Iraq. It is a little known
fact, rarely mentioned by most policymakers, that the American record
in the promotion of democracy and human rights in the Middle East
has been an undistinguished one since World War II, as the United
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States gradually became the major power in that region. It was not the
only Great Power of which this can be said. Beyond the appalling
record of the old colonial rulers, some of the most egregious violations
of human rights and most grotesque perversions of the popular will
that have marred post-World War II Middle Eastern history took place
in countries that were Soviet protégés from the 1960s through 1990,
notably Iraq, Syria, Libya, and South Yemen. The regimes of other
states aligned with the Soviets for much of this period, such as Egypt,
Algeria, and Yemen, hardly had good records on this score. Neverthe-
less, the record in regard to democracy and human rights of regimes
aligned with and supported by the United States during the Cold War
was often little better, from Saudi Arabia to Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia,
Turkey, and Iran under the Shah. The rationale for tolerating these
abuses was often the need to keep such countries on the side of the
United States during the Cold War.
Even after the United States became the undisputed Great Power in
the Middle East after the Cold War, things improved very little: Amer-
ican policymakers rarely, if ever, allowed the lack of democracy or the
abuse of human rights to serve as obstacles to relations with friendly
governments. Thus, a change by the Bush administration in what has
been a consistent approach over nearly six decades of seeking strategic
and material advantage, irrespective of the unrepresentative or repres-
sive nature of a given regime, would certainly be a thoroughly new
departure for American Middle East policy.
But several dauntingly difficult issues are raised by such a depar-
ture, laudable though it initially may appear. The first is that the
United States would not only have to be consistent as between friends
and others, it would also have to accept the full consequences of deal-
ing respectfully with democratically elected governments. Perhaps the
best historical example of the problems posed by such an approach is
that of France under de Gaulle. When the French President realized
that American forces under the NATO umbrella were carrying out
operations on French territory without the cognizance or consent of
the French government, he immediately asked for their removal and
was broadly supported in this by the French people. Of course, France
was and is a democracy and a major European power, and the United
States immediately, albeit unwillingly, accepted the verdict of the lead-
ers of the French Fifth Republic. Over forty years later, U.S. forces are
still not based in France, which nevertheless remains a NATO ally.
This is the case, notwithstanding the fierce attacks directed against
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France before, during, and after the Iraq war by voices in government
and the media.
In the current context, this raises the question of what if Saudi Ara-
bia were to become a democracy — perhaps not an immediate
prospect, but not an impossibility — and what if a democratically
elected government were to ask the United States to do something it
did not want to do, like remove its military forces, which the U.S.
resisted strongly until recently? Any such democratic government in
that country would make such a request if it were responsive to the
wishes of its people, since according to many apparently accurate
accounts, the U.S. military presence in the kingdom is unpopular
among a broad stratum of the population. In recognition of this fact, in
early 2003, the United States moved some of the forces it stationed in
Saudi Arabia after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to neighboring
Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman, and has since removed the rest.4
Nevertheless, these small countries cannot provide some of the facili-
ties that the huge expanse of Saudi Arabia offered. What if a democra-
tic Kuwait, Bahrain, and Qatar (all countries that have held elections of
some sort recently; indeed, Kuwait has had a parliament, with inter-
ruptions, since it became independent in 1960) were to ask the U.S. to
remove its bases? Would the United States simply withdraw all its
forces if asked to do so by democratic governments in this region?
These are not idle questions, especially since the disappearance of the
Iraqi Baath regime of Saddam Hussein has removed a major pretext
for the presence of U.S. forces in the region as a whole. Given the
demonstrated eagerness of the Pentagon to maintain military bases in
many parts of the Middle East, the likely answers to these questions do
not seem very encouraging, nor does the example set in the French
case appear likely to be followed.
To come to this conclusion, it is necessary only to examine carefully
the line of policy promulgated by the tight clique of neo-conservative
policy intellectuals surrounding Secretary of Defense Donald Rums-
feld and Vice President Richard Cheney. They include Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Undersecretary of Defense Douglas
Feith, Cheney’s Chief of Staff Lewis Libby, Assistant Secretary of State
John Bolton, and many other extreme ideologues. What is immediately
apparent if one examines the underside of their new rhetoric about
human rights and democracy is a longstanding and clear volition to
restructure the regimes of several key countries in the Middle East,
and thereby to reorganize the alignment of the entire Middle East. This
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is perhaps most clearly apparent from a 1996 report produced for
Israel’s then-Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu by an Israeli think
tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic and Political Studies. This
report was authored by a group headed by Richard Perle, Chair of the
Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board (forced by a financial scandal to step
down from the Chairmanship of the Board, he remains a member), and
the chief guru among the neo-con war hawks. The group included
Douglas Feith, the number three official at the Defense Department
who is currently responsible for the U.S. effort in Iraq, together with
other figures like David Wurmser, just appointed to head the Middle
East section on Vice President Cheney’s National Security staff.5
The advice these worthies gave to the hawkish Netanyahu was
robust and muscled, and it has been faithfully reflected in the policy of
Ariel Sharon, his successor as head of the Likud party. What did they
call on Israel to do?: abandon the “peace process” with the Palestinians
(the term peace process was placed in quotes throughout the report);
adopt the right of “hot pursuit” against the Palestinians; “roll-back”
threats; abandon the principle of “land for peace” in favor of “peace
for peace;” and adopt the policy of “peace through strength.” Most rel-
evant to the Middle East policies these individuals and their allies have
championed since taking over top positions in the Bush administration
were their recommendations regarding Iraq, Syria, and Iran.
The report counsels Israel to seize the strategic initiative by engag-
ing Syria, Hizballah, and Iran via military strikes at Hizballah and Syr-
ian forces in Lebanon, and if necessary, “striking at select targets in Syria
proper” (italics in original). Further, the report advised “weakening,
containing, and even rolling back Syria.” This core objective was to be
achieved primarily by “removing Saddam Hussein from power in
Iraq,” which they stated was “an important Israeli strategic objective in
its own right.” Jordan was cited as a key tool in this process, to be
employed by Israel against its enemies in various ways, even placing a
member of the Hashemite family that rules Jordan (and once ruled
Iraq) on the Iraqi throne. In a masterful piece of double-speak, the
report advises Netanyahu to state that, “Israel will not only contain its
foes; it will transcend them,” thus leaving to the imagination precisely
what infernal processes this would involve.
Much in this extraordinary document is worthy of comment, not
least of all the manifest ignorance of the history, politics, societies, and
religions of the Middle East that informs it throughout. It should be
noted that this is a distinguishing characteristic of most members of
Macalester International Vol. 14
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the neo-con war party in Washington who agitated ceaselessly for the
war in Iraq. This ignorance goes beyond the laughable, like mis-
spellings of names and places, to the core recommendations of the
report. Thus, Perle, Feith, and their colleagues suggested that putting a
member of the Hashemite family back on the throne in Iraq would
wean Shi’ites in Lebanon and Iraq away from Hizballah and Iran. This
master stroke is possible, the report claims, since “Shia retain strong
ties to the Hashemites: the Shia venerate foremost the Prophet’s fam-
ily, the direct descendants of which—and in whose veins the blood of
the Prophet flows — is [sic] King Hussein.” The lack of the most ele-
mentary knowledge of the history and religion of the region whose
complete restructuring these individuals grandly propose is breathtak-
ing: in fact, the Shi’ites were known as “shi’at ’Ali” or the party of ’Ali
ibn Abi Talib, cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, and
their loyalty was exclusively to him and his descendants, NOT to other
lineages descended from the Prophet’s family, such as the Umayyads,
the ’Abbassids, or the Hashemites. In other words, the Hashemites,
while related to the Prophet Muhammad, are not descended from him,
while the Shi’a have no ties and no loyalty to the Hashemites. More-
over, the ill will between Iraqi Shi’ites and the Sunni Hashemite
monarchy for over three decades is well attested. These are elementary
things that any college student who has taken a few courses on Middle
East history would know, but that these “prominent opinion makers,”
as they describe themselves in the introduction to the report, appar-
ently did not.
Equally noteworthy is the report’s perception of a complete equiva-
lence of Israeli and American interests in the Middle East. It stresses
the importance of “a shared philosophy of peace through strength,”
“continuity with Western values,” and cooperating “with the U.S. to
counter real threats to the region and the West’s security.” It advises
Netanyahu to use language “familiar to the Americans by tapping into
themes of American administrations during the Cold War which apply
well to Israel.” In what sounds eerily like a post-September 11 clarion
call, the report says a “clean break with the past” can be achieved by
“reestablishing the principle of preemption, rather than retaliation
alone and by ceasing to absorb blows to the nation without response.”
The general similarity is obvious between these recommendations and
the prescriptions for the American global strategy of the neo-con
group that has dominated the Bush administration since September 11.
What should also be obvious is that their prescriptions similarly con-
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stitute the template for current American strategy towards the Middle
East generally and Iraq in particular.6
This hegemonic strategic vision would almost certainly not be com-
patible with the freely expressed wishes of new Middle Eastern
democracies, wishes that might well include policies of resistance to
Israeli domination or the removal of American military bases estab-
lished with the consent of various non-democratic Middle Eastern oli-
garchs, autocrats, and dictators. This runs directly contrary to the
vision of these same neo-con intellectuals, who speak freely of estab-
lishing a long-lasting military presence not only in the fifteen countries
of the Middle East and Central Asia where U.S. forces are currently
based, but also elsewhere. All of this begs the rarely asked question of
whether American bases in such countries increase or decrease the
security of the United States in the long run, a question which, if asked
seriously, might have revolutionary implications for American strat-
egy and security. There is clearly a potential contradiction between the
apparent advocacy of democracy and human rights by the hard-line
hawks around Cheney and Rumsfeld, and their longstanding desire to
expand the American military profile in this part of the world as well
as in others. Given the oft-expressed contempt of many of these indi-
viduals for the peoples of this region, it is difficult to believe their
protestations that they are motivated by pure, disinterested concern
for the democratic and human rights of Arabs and Muslims. The 1996
report just cited never mentions the word “democracy,” and mentions
the advancement of “human rights among Arabs” solely as a tactic to
isolate and undermine the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
There is little doubt that significant majorities of the people in many
Middle Eastern countries thoroughly loathe their governments and
would be happy to see them replaced by democracies that respect
human rights. Nevertheless, there is every reason to question whether
these peoples are eager for that process to be managed by outsiders or
be accompanied by a long-lasting American military presence in major
Arab and Middle Eastern states, as is currently projected in Iraq. Such
an idea is particularly galling to Iraqis, given their country’s size and
regional weight as well as its rapid technical, social, and educational
advances, before the follies of the Baath regime dragged it into a series
of disastrous wars.
There are other solid historical reasons for suggesting that war,
external intervention, and foreign occupation are far from ideal recipes
for the introduction of democracy in this region. The historical experi-
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ence of the first half of the 20th century in a number of Arab countries,
as well as in Turkey and Iran, is illuminating. It is not well known that
both Iran and the Ottoman Empire (which encompassed most of the
eastern Arab countries until 1918) had constitutional revolutions in
1906 and 1908, respectively. The Ottomans, in fact, adopted a constitu-
tion in 1876, although it was soon afterwards suspended for thirty
years. Nevertheless, both countries had parliamentary democracies
and a free press well before such liberal innovations developed in Rus-
sia and much of eastern and southern Europe.
The pre-World War I experience of these two Middle Eastern parlia-
mentary, constitutional democratic regimes with the great parliamen-
tary democracies of the day, Britain and France, was far from happy.
Both Western powers behaved with an imperialist rapacity that was
indistinguishable from that of the great Romanov and Habsburg impe-
rial autocracies. In Egypt, meanwhile, Britain had occupied the coun-
try in 1882, partly to short-circuit a nationalist movement that aimed to
limit the autocracy of the Khedive and move toward parliamentary
democracy. The result was a British military occupation that lasted for
over seventy years, and that did much to stifle Egyptian democracy.
After World War I, things got even worse, in spite of the self-deter-
mination promised by President Wilson’s Fourteen Points. Britain pre-
vented the Egyptians from sending a delegation to the Paris Peace
Conference, thereby sparking the 1919 Egyptian revolution. Even after
Britain was forced to concede to Egypt a constitutional monarchy and
limited independence, it insisted on keeping military bases there,
notably in the strategic Suez Canal zone. Furthermore, Britain repeat-
edly intervened in Egypt in coordination with its local allies in the
monarchy and the aristocracy. This ensured that the popular majority
party, the Wafd, which probably could have won any free and fair
election during this period, was kept out of power for eighteen of the
next thirty years, until the military-led revolution of 1952.
Similar experiences faced the parliaments of Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
and Jordan, where Britain and France for decades maintained a mili-
tary occupation against the will of the population, forcibly suppressing
uprisings with great loss of life, as in Iraq in 1920 and Syria in 1925,
and foiling the will of elected parliaments, in collaboration with co-
opted local elites. When these parliamentary systems (that were rela-
tively democratic in spite of their many flaws) were overthrown in
nationalist military coups in Syria in the late 1940s and 1950s, they had
consequently become largely discredited and were little mourned.
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Britain and the U.S. similarly intervened in Iran in 1953 to frustrate the
wishes of a democratic government, ultimately bringing it down over
the issue of nationalization of the country’s oil industry, and then
installing the dictatorship of the Shah. There is also the case of Pales-
tine, where Britain foiled the wishes of the Palestinian Arab majority
for representative government from 1918 until 1948, during which
time they installed a Jewish national home at the expense of and
against the wishes of this majority.
What lessons can we draw from the experiences of this region with
democracy over the past few decades? The first is that an unwanted
foreign military occupation is incompatible with democratization. It is
hard to read the words of key Bush administration policymakers with-
out concluding that strategic motives relating to American hegemony
in the world of the 21st century are uppermost in their minds. If the
Bush administration has strategic objectives in the Middle East that
transcend its proclaimed desire for a better, more democratic life for
that region’s people, then we may be in for a repetition of one of the
ugliest phases of the Western encounter with this region.
Very few people in this country probably remember or know about
the bitterness with which the Arabs and Iranians regarded the Euro-
pean occupation of their countries until the 1950s and 1960s, and the
American and Soviet interventions that followed. However, very few
people in the Arab world and Iran are unaware of these long and
unhappy episodes in their history, for their educational systems instill
in them the same attitude toward these overbearing foreign powers as
our educational system does toward the despotic regime maintained
in the thirteen colonies by King George III and Great Britain until 1776.
Rather than being incubators of democracy in the Middle East, inva-
sion and occupation may in fact retard its development, as the histori-
cal record strongly suggests. What, then, can be done to address the
abysmal record of most Middle Eastern countries with regard to
democracy and human rights? To be more precise, we are talking
mainly of the Arab countries, for most of them are in a far worse situa-
tion than are Turkey, Iran, and Israel. This is the case in spite of the
Turkish military’s ubiquitous involvement in politics and its che-
quered record as far as the Kurds are concerned; in spite of the poor
record of Iran toward minorities and the manifest weaknesses of its
new democratic system in the face of the continuing power of the theo-
cratic religious establishment; and in spite of Israel’s poor record as a
belligerent occupier of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for more than
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thirty-six years. All three countries nevertheless have functioning
democracies in spite of these grave defects in their records.
In the Arab states, by contrast, the record is generally worse. There
is the occasional relatively bright spot, such as the three Gulf countries
that enjoy some aspects of democracy, although in the case of Qatar
and Bahrain, they are very new and fragile, and in all cases small oli-
garchies make most of the key decisions; Lebanon, whose democracy
has weathered two civil wars, occupation by both of its neighbors,
Israel and Syria, and the stresses produced from 1968–1982 by a Pales-
tinian state within a state; and Morocco, Egypt, Yemen, the United
Arab Emirates, and Jordan, each of which has elements of a free press,
the rule of law, and some of the forms of democracy, albeit without
most of the substance. But contrasting with these somewhat bright
spots (each of which is obscured in important ways) is an array of dark
holes of dictatorial rule and wholesale denial of civil, political, human
and other rights, ranging from Algeria, Tunisia, the Sudan, Libya,
Saudi Arabia, and Oman to Syria and Iraq.
How can democracy be encouraged to grow where the buds are
already in existence, and how can it be sown where the soil appears to
be so barren? The first thing that must be recognized is that many Arab
countries are far from devoid of a democratic tradition, notably all of
the largest of them and a number of others, including Egypt, the
Sudan, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Lebanon. This is, therefore, not
a matter of enlightened Americans or Westerners bringing progress to
a bunch of benighted Arabs stuck in the Middle Ages, which is the gist
of what is said by all too many of the “experts” who pontificate on this
subject in the media.
A second point is that this political struggle has nothing to do with
Islam. Only their ignorance allows some so-called experts to make
such assertions, which are belied by the thriving democracies in three
of the largest Muslim countries in the world, Indonesia, Bangladesh,
and Malaysia (not to speak of Turkey, Iran, and all the Arab countries
that once had parliamentary systems). Egypt did not cease to be a
Muslim country during the thirty years it experienced parliamentary
government, from 1922–1952. Was it because of Islam that democracy
failed in Egypt? Of course not! It had much more to do with the fact
that Egypt’s parliamentary regime was undermined by overt and
covert British intervention, in collusion with the monarchy and aristoc-
racy, so that it was incapable of ending the 70-year-old British military
occupation or solving the country’s other problems. There is plentiful
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evidence that Islam is no more incompatible with democracy than is
any other major religion. The fact that Islam is capable of producing
anti-democratic trends in no way justifies sweeping statements about
its incompatibility with democracy, any more than the powerful
monarchical, anti-democratic and anti-republican trends within
French Catholicism in the late 19th century would justify such igno-
rant and malignant statements about Christianity.
Where does this leave us as far as the nexus between democratiza-
tion, human rights, and United States policy in the Middle East is con-
cerned? Clearly, external intervention, especially military intervention,
exacerbates the situation. Let us remember this as we watch the Amer-
ican occupation of Iraq unfold. Secondly, a strong case can be made
that the endemic conflicts in the region, notably those between the
Palestinians and Israelis and between Iraq and its neighbors, are major
barriers to democratization. The growth of military budgets and the
increased power of the state (at the expense of civil society) have been
born of many factors, but among the most important are wars and
other conflicts. Resolving these conflicts will not be easy. Remember
that we are not just talking of Palestine-Israel but also the conflicts
between Iraq and several of its neighbors, the Cyprus dispute, and
other conflicts internal to the countries in question, as in Turkish and
Iraqi Kurdistan and the southern Sudan. However, while resolving
these disputes will not automatically bring democracy, allowing them
to fester provides a pretext for the aggrandizement of state power as
well as guarantees the constant creation of new obstacles to democrati-
zation and respect for human rights.
These conflicts ultimately have to be matters for the peoples of these
countries to resolve for themselves. All external actors can do is limit
their own intervention, help resolve disputes such as those between
Israel and the Palestinians or over Cyprus (that they exacerbated by
their past policies), and try to help civil society assert itself in the face
of the enormous power of the state. Without wanting to overstress the
weight of history, it would be well to recall that this region has been
home to the first and some of the longest-lasting states in human his-
tory, in the Nile and Mesopotamian river valleys. It has a long tradi-
tion of powerful states that continued with the Islamic era, culminating
in the more than 500-year history of the Ottoman Empire, one of the
most powerful and best-organized early modern states. At the same
time, the Middle East was also home to some of the greatest products
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of mankind’s individual genius and prophetic vision, which can be set
against this longstanding tradition of state power.
In view of these great traditions, which had been well established
for many centuries while Europe was still sunken in barbarism and
ignorance, perhaps we should be a little more humble in our treatment
of this region, afflicted though it is by some of the most unattractive
regimes and intractable conflicts in the modern world. That humility,
as well as attention to some of the historical points raised, is more
likely to be a sound basis for moving the Middle East toward greater
democracy and respect for human rights than are the claims of the
Bush administration and its supportive voices in the media that the
American military occupation will spark a new dawn of democracy in
the Arab world. 
Notes
1. It could be argued that the Mexican-American and Spanish-American wars were
unprovoked, but they were certainly not preemptive wars: no one claimed that Mexico
or Spain endangered the United States or were about to attack it.
2. Poindexter was recently forced out of his Pentagon job as head of the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Administration (DARPA) after revelations about a DARPA
scheme for investors to, in effect, bet on the likelihood of terrorist attacks, assassinations,
and other similar disasters. Abrams is the President’s senior advisor on the Middle East
in the National Security Council. Other Iran-Contra veterans in senior positions in the
Bush administration include Otto Reich and John Negroponte, neither of whom was
ever indicted for their role in that fiasco.
3. These officials also described the reluctance of the Turkish government as “extortion
in the name of alliance.” David E. Sanger with Dexter Filkins, “U.S. is Pessimistic Turks
will Accept Aid Deal on Iraq,” The New York Times (20 February 2003): A1.
4. The Saudi government linked the removal of U.S. troops and bases to democratic
reforms internally. See Patrick E. Tyler, “Saudis Plan End to U.S. Presence: Talk of
Future Troop Expulsion, then Democratic Reforms,” The New York Times (9 February
2003): A1, A12.
5. The report was entitled, “A Clean Break: A New Strategy for Securing the Realm,” and
can be located at http://www.israeleeconomy.org/strat1.htm.
6. There are numerous analyses of this report, such as Jason Vest, “The Men from JINSA
and CSP,” The Nation (2 September 2002); Akiva Eldar, “Perles of Wisdom for the Feith-
ful,” Haaretz (1 October 2002); Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, “The Men who Stole the Show,”
Foreign Policy in Focus (6 November 2002); Brian Whitaker, “Playing Skittles with Sad-
dam,” The Guardian (3 September 2002); Robert Fisk, “The Case against War,” Counter-
punch (15 February 2003); and Akiva Eldar, “There is Fire Even Without a Smoking
Gun,” Haaretz (16 February 2003).
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